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Consider the following static game of incomplete information. Nature selects X (Player 1’s type) where X=0 with probability 1/3 and X=12 with probability 2/3. Player 1 observes X but Player 2 does not. Player 2 only knows that X can be 0 or 12 and the probabilities with which Nature selects X=0 or X=12. Players I and 2 make simultaneous and independent choices and receive payoffs given by matrix below. In this game, Player 1 has  possible strategies, and in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game Player 1 gets an expected payoff of . Please, enter numerical values only, for example: 0,1, 2,…

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